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ABSTRACT  ARTICLE INFO 
Introduction/Main Objectives: This study examines the effect of
institutional ownership, proxied by government and private
ownership, and bank monitoring on agency conflicts. Background
Problems: The previous literature focused on agency conflicts,
particularly those between managers and shareholders in developed
markets, with much less evidence being presented from emerging
ones. Novelty: We consider the role of creditors (the banks) in
mitigating agency conflicts, and the managers’ irresponsible behavior,
which in previous studies has been largely under-elaborated.
Research Methods: Using 1,525 observations of 305 non-financial
companies that were listed in the 2011-2015 period, we employ the
generalized least squares method to deal with potential econometric
concern such as autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Finding/Results: We find that institutional ownership and bank
monitoring, proxied by the number of banks and the share of their
loans, are negatively related to agency conflicts. Conclusion: Banks
and institutional ownership lead to lower agency conflicts. However,
one should mitigate free-rider problems emanated from these
relationships. 
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The literature contends that a firm is a set of 
various contracts among related parties in which 
they often have different and conflicting 
interests among each other, which are the so-
called agency conflicts (Jensen &Meckling, 
1976). Studies suggest that various measures 
have been employed to mitigate such issues, 
particularly the design of the ownership’s 
structure (Jensen &Meckling, 1976; Ang et al., 
2000; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Fleming et al., 
2005; Florackis, 2008).  
In emerging markets (EM), such agency 
conflicts are more complex given their weak 
institutional development and investor 
protection(Claessens&Yurtoglu,2013). Owner-
ship structure become a pivotal factor in shaping 
firm governance and performance, and hence 
most firms in Southeast Asia have concentrated 
ownerships (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes&Shleifer, 1999). In Indonesia, 
for example, institutional investors make up 
more than 90% of ownerships (OJK, 2017). On 
the one hand, the large and sophisticated 
institutional investors presumably encourage 
better corporate governance; thus reducing 
agency conflict (Shleifer&Vishny, 1986; 
Demsetz, 1983 in Agrawal &Mandelker, 1990; 
Bathala et al., 1994; Ang et al., 2000; Gillan& 
Starks, 2000; Noe, 2002). On the other hand, 
they are prone to push a firm’s managers to act 
in the best interests of these investors, causing a 
conflict of interest between the majority and 
minority shareholders (agency problem type II). 
Institutional ownership, as the majority 
shareholder, may take opportunistic behavior at 
the expense of the other shareholders 
(Shleifer&Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Muniandy et al., 2016). 
We argue that to obtain the funding needed 
for their investments, firms in emerging markets, 
including Indonesia, rely on bank loans rather 
than on the capital markets, consdering their 
level of developments (see, e.g., survey by 
Demirgüç-Kunt& Levine, 1999; Beck et al., 
2010). This implies the firms’ high dependence 
on loans as their source of funds, rendering the 
banks’ monitoring roles as being to enforce the 
loan agreements, to discipline the firm’s 
managers, and to eventually reduce the agency 
conflict between the different parties in the firm 
(e.g. between manager and shareholders).The 
inclusion of banks in the relationship between 
the firm’s managers and shareholders would 
serve as the external mechanism of good 
corporate governance, by which agency conflicts 
in the firm could be mitigated. In order to 
achieve these objectives, banks would require 
the firms to provide the necessary disclosure, 
from which they can assess the risk or urge 
certain actions be taken by the firms’ managers, 
thus improving firm performance (Gillan& 
Starks, 2000; Fama, 1985 in Florackis, 2008; 
Ahn& Choi, 2009; Fok et al., 2004; Byers et al., 
2008; Dass& Massa, 2011, Setiyono, B., & 
Tarazi, A. 2014). 
A bank lessens its monitoring of its 
borrowers when another bank also lends money 
to the same borrower, a situation which probably 
discourages bank from closely monitoring its 
debtor due to the assumption that the other 
creditor bank is monitoring the firm, leading to a 
free-riding problem (Ang et al., 2000; Florackis 
et al., 2008). However, a higher loan proportion 
from a bank entails tougher bank monitoring of 
the firm because of the higher credit risk 
exposure, which increases with the size of the 
corporate loan (Ang et al., 2000).Considering 
that the weak investor protection might 
exaggerate conflicts among shareholders, 
creditors/lenders and managers, the presence of a 
number of banks arguably would mitigate the 
potential conflicts between the parties, yet at the 
same time might induce free-riding by them. 
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Our study contributes to the existing 
literature by showing evidence of the impact of 
institutional ownership on firms’ agency 
conflicts by considering different levels of their 
banks’ monitoring, which has been understudied 
in the previous literature (see, e.g., Ang et al., 
2000; Lin & Fu, 2017) as it only focused on the 
institutional ownership-agency conflict relation-
ship. Also, Dass and Massa (2011) only tested 
the impact of the lending bank on firm 
governance. We also contribute to the existing 
literature by providing complementary evidence 
about the effect of external governance 
mechanisms and certain types of ownership on 
the agency conflict, in addition to the current 
studies in the Asian context, for instance, those 
by Wiwattanakantang(2001) and Lin & Lin 
(2013)that focused on performance.  
We, hence, advance the question of whether 
institutional ownership and bank monitoring 
mitigate agency conflicts, and do they eventually 
affect firm performance? This study broadens 
the factors affecting agency conflict by assessing 
bank monitoring, proxies by the number of 
banks and the bank loan ratio, in addition to 
ownership structure, which was more frequently 
tested in the previous studies.  
Whilst other studies provide evidence from 
developed countries (e.g., McKnight & Weir, 
2009; Agrawal &Knoeber, 1996; Ang et al., 
2000), we extend these study to a less 
elaborated-on area, an emerging market, which 
is notably different in the nature of its investor 
protection, governance mechanism and owner-
ship structure compared to their counterparts in 
the Western or developed countries (Claessens 
&Yurtoglu, 2013).  
Using 1,525 observations of non-financial 
companies that were already listed during the 
period from2011 to2015, this study aims to test 
the effect of institutional ownerships and bank 
monitoring on agency conflicts. The ratios of 
asset utilization, and sale sand general and 
administrative expenses are used as measures of 
the agency conflict. This study also examines the 
effect of institutional ownership on agency 
conflicts at different levels of bank monitoring -
measured by the number of banks and their loan 
shares. There might be free-riders among the 
parties overseeing the firms, based on the fact 
that several lending banks may concurrently 
monitor them, resulting in unclear ultimate 
effects. Our evidence suggests that the influence 
of institutional ownership on agency conflict 
varies with different levels of bank monitoring, 
supporting Yu et al. (2012) and Shepherd et al. 
(2007). 
This paper is organized as follows: It begins 
with a review of related literature on the agency 
theory, ownerships, and monitoring by banks. 
Further, the subsequent sections of this paper 
will discuss the methodological approach used, 
the empirical results, and conclusions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Agency Conflict and Ownership 
Agency relationships have been a pivotal 
dimension since the seminal work of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). They contended that in a 
contract between the principals (i.e., 
shareholders) that delegates the agent (i.e. the 
management) to serve their interests, conflicts 
potentially emerge because the managers are 
inclined to serve their own interests and take 
opportunistic behavior. In firms with highly 
concentrated ownership, however, agency 
conflicts may also occur among their 
shareholders, particularly between the majority 
and minority ones (see, e.g., Ang et al., 2000; 
Singh & Davidson, 2003; Fleming et al., 2005; 
Florackis, 2008).  
The active monitoring hypothesis argues that 
institutional investors will use their advantages 
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to actively monitor the management (Demsetz, 
1983; Shleifer&Vishny, 1986 in Agrawal 
&Mandelker, 1990). One of the advantages is 
the considerably large amount of invested capital 
and the skills that institutional investors possess, 
meaning they should be better at supervising the 
management and realizing substantial returns 
vis-á-vis the small investors. The large owner-
ship, and hence its returns, should be more than 
enough to compensate for the monitoring costs 
incurred by the institutions (Shleifer&Vishny, 
1986; Bathala et al., 1994; Gillan& Starks, 2000; 
Chung & Lee, 2020). Further, some note that 
institutional investors have a superior capability, 
professional knowledge, and voting interests to 
encourage managers to improve efficiency and 
governance, and to help them make better 
decisions (David &Kochhar, 1996; Lin & Fu, 
2017).  
Agrawal (1990) described the passive voting 
hypothesis, stating that institutional investors 
tend to follow management decisions, abstain in 
voting, or choose to sell their shares to avoid 
having to vote. According to this view, 
institutional ownerships will have no effect on a 
firm. Accordingly, David and Kochhar (1996) 
argued that there are some obstacles that hinder 
the institutional ownerships’ significantly impact 
on firm performance, particularly due to the 
investors’ institutional business relationships 
with the firm and the regulatory limit.  
In contrast, the exploitation hypothesis posits 
that large investors collude with managers to 
exploit minority shareholders, rendering any 
management misbehavior done for the 
managers’ benefit also beneficial for them. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that large 
investors such as institutional owners might 
destroy the value of the firm due to the conflict 
of interests with other investors. The majority 
shareholders may prioritize themselves by 
sabotaging other shareholders, requiring special 
dividends for themselves, or exploiting business 
opportunities with associated companies.  
Various studies have put much effort into 
examining agency conflicts with regard to 
institutional ownership, and find inconsistent 
results such as in the UK (e.g. McKnight and 
Weir, 2009), in the U.S (e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber,1996; Ang et al., 2000), and Asia (e.g., 
Lin & Fu, 2017). Another strand of the literature 
elaborates on the role of government ownership 
of firms. On one hand, governments are regarded 
as lacking the supervisory incentives and skills, 
because they are under pressure to serve certain 
political interests (Qi et al., 2008), and to 
achieve political objectives, possibly at the 
expense of the firm itself and the general public 
(Shleifer &Vishny, 1994 in La Porta, 1999). On 
the other hand, these studies also document the 
government’s role in advancing economic 
growth, including through their control over 
firms (e.g., Ang and Ding, 2006; Ahmad et al., 
2008). 
2. Debt, Bank Loan, and Agency Conflict 
In addition to the ownership structure, debt 
might be regarded as a mechanism to mitigate 
the agency conflict in a firm. Jensen (1986) 
argued that debt contains a commitment to pay a 
part of the free cash flow in the future, and hence 
it plays a role in reducing the cash available to 
the managers, which otherwise could be used to 
pay for perks or other managers’ private 
facilities. The debt contract should encourage 
managers to increase their firm’s efficiency. 
Debt obtained from banks (loans) is regarded 
differently, compared to that from other funds 
providers, because banks are presumably better 
at accessing and utilizing information about 
firms. Each bank has not only dealt with one or 
two debtor firms in the past, but also with many 
other firms from various industries. From that, a 
bank is able to extrapolate information in order 
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to assess the performance and prospects of 
potential borrowers (Boot, 2000). Furthermore, 
the obligation for the firm to share its 
operational information with the lending bank 
encourages the firm to improve its governance 
(Fama, 1985; Dass& Massa, 2011), to ensure all 
the loans are repaid by the firm in accordance 
with the contract and to keep the bank’s credit 
risk low (Diamond, 1984; Freixas&Rochet, 
2008).  
In bank-firm relationships, a firm might 
decide to borrow either from only one or several 
banks simultaneously. In the case of borrowing 
from several banks (multiple banking), Diamond 
(1984) argued that incentives to monitor the firm 
by Bank A, for instance, will diminish if there is 
a greater presence of other banks (Bank B, Bank 
C etc.), triggering a free-rider problem where 
each bank will loosen its monitoring on the firm 
in the hope that the others will maintain or 
increase their levels. The bank probably expects 
the duration of its relationship with the firm to 
be short, given the possibility of the firm 
switching to another bank. However, since the 
investor protection and institutional development 
levels in emerging countries are largely weak 
(see, e.g., Claessens et al, 2000; Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013), the incentive for continued 
monitoring by each bank in such an arrangement 
is intensified. For the arguments above, the net 
effect of multiple banking on the firm, parti-
cularly in emerging markets, remains debatable. 
With regards to the borrowing relationship, 
previous studies documented that borrowing 
from several banks is related to higher free-rider 
problems (Yu et al., 2012), agency conflict (Ang 
et al., 2000) and lower performance (Fok et al., 
2004). In case the firm only borrows from one 
bank, this bank will solely bear the credit risk, as 
opposed to borrowing from multiple banks. 
Other studies, however, suggest that as a firm 
increases its borrowing from the bank, the credit 
risk will go up, which in turn pushes the bank to 
stricken the loan monitoring (Khalil &Parigi, 
1998 in Dass&Masa, 2009; Ahn& Choi, 2009; 
Fok et al., 2004). Several studies conclude that 
bank loans, measured by the total bank loan 
divided by the total assets of the firm, relate to 
less agency conflict (Ang et al., 2000), lower 
earnings management behavior (Ahn and Choi, 
2009), lower over/underinvestment problems 
(Setiawan, 2012), and surprisingly to lower 
performance (Fok et al., 2004). 
DATA AND METHOD 
This study used a sample of firms listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) between2011 
and2015. Firms from the financial sectors were 
not included in the study due to differences in 
the regulations governing them, and their 
characteristics. Data on the firms were collected 
from various sources including the IDX official 
website, the firms’ websites, and the Bloomberg 
and OSIRIS databases. The sample consisted of 
305 firms with the data taken throughout 5 
periods, resulting in 1,525 observations. As 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are 
presumably observable in all the equations, we 
deployed the generalized least squares method to 
deal with such concerns. 
1. Variables Measurement 
1.1.  Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study was agency 
conflict (CONFLICT). Previous studies (e.g., 
Ang et al., 2000; Singh & Davidson, 2003; 
Fleming et al., 2005) used two proxies to 
represent the agency conflict variable used in 
this study: 1) the asset utilization ratio (AUR) 
and, 2) the sales, general and administrative 
(ADM) expense ratio.  
The AUR is calculated by dividing sales by 
total assets, as adopted by Ang et al. (2000), 
Singh and Davidson (2003), and Fleming et al. 
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(2005). A low ratio will arise from improper 
investment decisions, failure to use the assets 
productively and an excessive consumption of 
perks (Ang et al., 2000; Singh & Davidson, 
2003; Fleming et al., 2005). Meanwhile a high 
ratio reflects the management’s efficiency in 
managing the assets and creating value for the 
firm’s owners. Greater agency conflict is 
reflected by a lower asset utilization ratio. 
The second measure used is the sales, 
general and administrative (ADM) expense 
ratio, calculated as sales, general and adminis-
trative expenses divided by annual sales. The 
numerator includes management salaries, 
insurance, supplies, travel expenses, and other 
discretionary expenses. This P&L’s item is 
considered to be a proxy of agency conflict, 
because it describes the extent of the expenses, 
particularly excessive perquisites (e.g., a high 
expense ratio indicates high agency conflict).  
1.2. Independent Variables 
a)  Institutional ownership (Inst) 
We use institutional ownership as our main 
variable which is measured by dividing the 
numbers of outstanding shares held by the 
institutions by the total number of the firms’ 
outstanding shares, as in Lin &Fu (2017), 
Chen (2001), Chen, Harford, &Li (2007), 
and Ferreira &Matos (2008). For further 
checking, we split this variable into 
government ownership (GOV), and private 
institutional ownership (PRIV). Hence, we 
set the total institutional ownership as the 
sum of both types of ownership. 
b)  Bank Monitoring (MON) 
The bank monitoring used in this study was 
measured using two proxies for the firm 
level: the number of banks (NUM) and the 
ratio of the bank loans(LOANRATIO). We 
used the number of banks as the bank 
monitoring proxy, as in Ang et al. (2000), 
Fok et al. (2004), Ahn and Choi (2009), and 
Yu et al. (2012). The number of banks 
variable was then expressed as the natural 
logarithm of the number of banks plus one. 
The ratio of bank loans was calculated by 
dividing the amount of bank loans by the 
firm’s total assets, as per Ahn and Choi 
(2009) and Setiawan (2012). 
c)  Dummy Bank Monitoring (dMON) 
The bank monitoring dummy variable was 
used as a moderation variable. There are two 
bank monitoring dummy variable sin this 
research: the dummy number of banks 
(dNUM) and the dummy ratio of bank loans 
(dLOANRATIO)at the firm level. The 
variable dNUM was used to distinguish the 
firms with loans from a large number of 
banks from firms with loans from only one 
or a few banks. A firm has a high bank 
number when it receives loans from more 
banks than the median value of the NUM 
variable. Dummy 1 is given to firms with a 
higher-than-median bank number and 0 
otherwise; while dLOANRATIO sets 1 for 
firms with high bank loan ratios, which are 
those where the bank loan ratio is higher 
than the median value of the loan ratio 
variable, and 0 otherwise. 
1.3. Control Variables 
Singh and Davidson (2003) argued the effect of 
size on the costs incurred by firms. Ang et al. 
(2000) also controlled for the size of firms 
because of significant cost differences among 
different sized firms. Doukaset al. (2000), in 
McKnight and Weir (2009), contended that the 
increased agency conflict in bigger firms was 
due to the complexity of the management and 
the information supplied by them. Firm size 
(SIZE)was estimated to affect the agency 
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conflict and was measured by the firm’s total 
assets.  
Firms that have been operating for some 
time are considered to have a well-structured 
operation and sufficient resources (Ariff et al., 
2007). In addition, the firms will take their 
reputation hence we expect there is a negative 
relationship between the age of the firm (AGE) 
and agency conflict.  
We control for industry (IND) because each 
industrial sector has different interests related to 
inventories and fixed assets, which impacts on 
the efficiency difference between industries 
(Ang et al., 2000). The year of observation was 
also included as a control variable. This was to 
anticipate circumstance differences in different 
years that affect the asset utilization ratio as well 
as the sales, general and administrative expense 
ratio.  
2. Empirical Model 
To examine the effect of institutional ownerships 
and bank supervision on agency conflict, we 
specify our model as follows: CONFLICT = α + β INST + β MON	 +	 																β SIZE +	β AGE + β IND + 									β YEAR + 	ε (1) 
CONFLICT is the agency conflict proxied 
by the asset utilization ratio (AUR) and the 
sales, general and administrative (ADM) 
expense ratio. INST shows the portion of 
institutional ownership that includes total 
institutional ownership (INST), and government 
(GOV) and private (PRIV) ownership. MON is 
bank monitoring proxied by the bank lender 
number (NUM) and total bank loans to total 
assets ratio (LOANRATIO). SIZE is the firm’s 
size measured by its total assets, AGE shows the 
firms’ age measured from the difference between 
the year of observation and the year the firm was 
incorporated. IND and YEAR are dummies for 
the industrial sector and year. 
Accordingly, to examine the effect of 
institutional ownership on agency conflict at 
different levels of bank monitoring, we set our 
model as follows: CONFLICT = α + β INST + β dMON	 + 												β INST ∗ dMON	 +	β SIZE , +  
          β AGE + β IND + β YEAR + ε  (2) 
CONFLICT is the agency conflict proxied 
by the asset utilization ratio (AUR) and the 
sales, general and administrative (ADM) 
expense ratio. INST shows the portion of 
institutional ownership, including total 
institutional ownership (INST), and government 
(GOV) and private institutions (PRIV) 
ownership. dMON is a dummy describing 
different levels of bank monitoring, consisted of 
dNUM(dummy number of bank lenders) and 
dLOANRATIO(dummy total bank loans ratio 
to total assets). The sample will have a dNUM 
value of 1 if it borrows from a bank number 
higher than the median and 0 otherwise. The 
sample will have a dLOANRATIO value of 1 if 
its bank debt ratio is higher than the median and 
0 otherwise. Also variable INST * dMON is an 
interaction variable between INST ownership 
and dMON.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we report the descriptive 
statistics of the variables in this research.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
VAR. N Mean Med Min Max SD Skew. Kurt. 
AUR 1,525 0.953 0.804 0.0144 3.788 0.738 1.450 5.458 
ADM 1,277 0.115 0.064 0.0063 1.034 0.154 3.517 18.200 
INST 1,525 0.675 0.700 0 0.999 0.213 -0.894 3.805 
GOV 1,525 0.0410 0 0 0.800 0.160 3.784 15.78 
PRIV 1,525 0.633 0.675 0 0.999 0.260 -0.941 3.283 
Num 1,489 4.059 3 0 21 4.040 2.003 7.581 
LOANRATIO 1,489 0.187 0.159 0 0.762 0.163 1.108 4.228 
Size (million) 1,525 7,737,152 2,089,516 3,092.97 2.45e+08 1.83e+07 6.643 64.420 
Age (year) 1,525 29.721 28 2 114 17.233 1.718 8.498 
Source: Author calculations 
Before we proceeded further, we excluded 
the largest and smallest 1% extreme values in 
this study to mitigate the outlier problem. We 
finally observed the average of AUR is 0.953 
and ADM is 0.015. The INST variable had an 
average of 0.675, indicating firm ownership in 
Indonesia tends to be concentrated. The GOV 
variable showed the government’s average 
ownership of shares in firms is 0.04. The 
ownership of shares by the government is low, 
and only about 10% of firms have some govern-
ment ownership. The PRIV variable showed the 
percentage of shares owned by private institu-
tions is approximately 0.633. 
The NUM variable showed the number of 
banks that lento a particular firm (approximately 
four banks). This data supports Yu et al. (2012), 
who stated that firms in developing countries 
generally obtain loans from more than one bank. 
While the other proxy for the bank monitoring, 
LOANRATIO, showed mean of 0.187 with the 
highest debt ratio reaching0.762. The total assets 
in this study had an average value of 
Rp7.73trillionRp2.1 trillion. Observation of the 
firm’s age finds that the firms in this study are 
29.72 years old, on average, with a median of 28 
years old. All the variables indicated an adequate 
heterogeneity that allowed us to continue onto 
the next analysis. 
2. Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 shows the result of the univariate 
analysis on the samples grouped by the 
magnitude (high vs. low) of each type of agency 
conflict variable. The subsample with a higher 
AUR (lower ADM) than the median AUR 
(ADM) is classified as a low agency conflict, 
whereas the subsamples with a lower AUR 
(higher ADM) than the median AUR (ADM) are 
high agency conflicts. Based on AUR, firms 
with low agency conflicts have a higher average 
percentage of total institutional ownership and 
private institutions, a smaller size, and older age. 
AUR as a proxy of agency conflict does not 
show any significant difference in the bank 
monitoring variable, including the bank number 
and bank debt ratio.  
Whereas based on ADM, the subsample with 
a low agency conflict has a higher total of 
institutional ownership and private ownership, a 
higher number of bank lenders, a higher bank 
debt ratio, bigger size, and older age. The 
univariate test result fails to find any differences 
in government institutional ownership; either for 
the agency conflict measurement based on AUR 
or ADM. The SIZE control variable also shows 
inconsistent results in both the agency conflict’s 
proxies. 
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3. Multivariate Analysis 
In this section the regressions of agency conflict 
measures (AUR, ADM) on the institutional 
ownership (INST, GOV, PRIV) and bank 
monitoring (NUM, LONRATIO) are discussed.  
3.1. Agency Conflict as Measured by Asset 
Utilization Ratio 
Table 3 shows the regression result using 
AUR as an agency conflict proxy. This research 
regressed each of the institutional ownership 
variables with the bank number and bank loan 
ratio as bank monitoring proxies. The control 
variables used consisted of size, age, sector, and 
year of observation, but only the size and age 
variables are shown in the table. 
Table 2. Univariate analysis results 
 AUR ADM 
Variable High Low Diff p-value High Low Diff p-value 
INST 0.712 0.638 0.074 0.0000*** 0.666 0.696 -0.030 0.0089***
GOV 0.043 0.038 0.005 0.4708 0.050 0.044 0.006 0.5927 
PRIV 0.667 0.599 0.068 0.0000*** 0.616 0.650 -0.034 0.0214** 
NUM 3.841 4.181 -0.340 0.1019 3.478 4.516 -1.038 0.0000***
LOANRATIO 0.190 0.195 -0.005 0.6472 0.170 0.204 -0.034 0.0002***
SIZE 5,704,760 9,769,543 -4,064,783 0.0000*** 4,982,241 1.09e+07 -5,945,363 0.0000***
AGE 32.807 26.635 6.172 0.0000*** 28.387 32.362 -3.975 0.0000***
Note: This table reports t-test results for INST, GOV, PRIV, num, loan ratio, size and age based on the high agency conflict 
subsample and low agency conflict subsample. Agency conflict is measured by AUR and ADM. Subsamples with 
AUR higher (ADM lower) than median AUR (ADM) are classified as low agency conflicts, whereas otherwise they 
will be high agency conflicts. *, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. INST, GOV, 
PRIV, num, and loan ratio are in decimals. 
Table 3. Regression result using Asset Utilization (AUR) as a proxy for agency conflict 
VARIABLES 
AUR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INST 0.493***   0.457***   
 (0.105)   (0.106)   
GOV  0.373**   0.364**  
  (0.147)   (0.149)  
PRIV   0.222**   0.207** 
   (0.0903)   (0.0916) 
NUM 0.208*** 0.201*** 0.200***    
 (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0377)    
LOANRATIO    0.0846 0.145 0.0688 
    (0.140) (0.142) (0.141) 
SIZE -0.0726*** -0.0834*** -0.0684*** -0.0226 -0.0344** -0.0206 
 (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
AGE 0.300*** 0.282*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.289*** 0.307*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0384) (0.0388) (0.0387) 
CONSTANT -1.286*** -0.839*** -1.143*** -1.740*** -1.320*** -1.588*** 
 (0.291) (0.284) (0.295) (0.284) (0.275) (0.287) 
       
Obs. 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,489 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: : *, **, *** represents a significance level of10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. AUR, NUM, SIZE and AGE are natural 
logarithms, while INST, GOV, PRIV and LOANRATIO are in decimals. Higher agency conflict is reflected by low 
asset utilization ratio. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The test result consistently indicated positive 
and significant (at α = 1%) influence of total 
institutional ownership on the asset utilization 
ratio. Institutional ownership may improve asset 
utilization (i.e., indicated by a lower AUR) and 
hence reduce the agency problem. Government 
ownership also impacted positively on the asset 
utilization ratio. The third institutional owner-
ship variable, private institutional ownership 
also positively affected AUR. Overall, the test 
result using AUR successfully proved the 
decrease in agency conflict with the increase of 
institutional ownership supporting the active 
surveillance view of Demsetz (1983) in Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1990), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Bathala et al. (1994), and Gillan and 
Starks (2000).  
Next, we examined the impact of bank 
monitoring with two proxies; the number of 
banks and the loan ratios. First, the regression 
result on the NUM variable, as the bank 
monitoring’s proxy, consistently showed that the 
number of banks providing loans had a positive 
effect on AUR. As the number of banks 
increased, AUR increased, implying a lower 
agency conflict. This shows the absence of the 
free-rider phenomenon in the banks ‘monitoring 
of their debtor firm, which differs from Ang et 
al. (2000), Ahn and Choi (2009), and Yu et al. 
(2012). The alternative proxy of bank 
monitoring, loan ratio shows an insignificant 
coefficient at any level.  
The effect of the firm’s size on the agency 
conflict showed a significant negative coeffi-
cient, showing that the larger the firm size, the 
lower the AUR, which means the agency 
conflict is increasing. The test result also 
indicated that the older the firm was, the higher 
the AUR. This shows that the older firms have 
less agency conflicts.  
3.2.  Agency Conflict as Measured by Sales, 
General and Administrative Expenses Ratio 
Table 4 summarizes the regression result with 
the sales, general and administrative (ADM) 
expenses ratio as the agency conflict proxy. 
Similar to the previous table, this table contains 
the regression results for each of the institutional 
ownerships, with the bank number and bank loan 
ratio as the bank monitoring’s proxy. 
The test result proved the effect of total 
institutional ownership on ADM is negative and 
significant; implying an increase in total institu-
tion ownership will decrease the ADM ratio (the 
decrease of agency conflict). Government 
ownership showed no significant impact, 
whereas private ownership proved to have a 
significant negative coefficient, suggesting that 
private institutions will limit the ADM ratio and 
the agency conflict.  
The number of banks (NUM) has significant 
positive signs (see models1 to3 in Table 4), 
confirming that as the number of lending banks 
increases, the agency conflict measured by 
ADM decreases. This is in line with the results 
for AUR (Table 3), suggesting there is tougher 
monitoring and no free-riders among the banks. 
Furthermore, tests on the influence of the bank 
loan ratio as the proxy of bank supervision also 
exhibits a significant negative influence (see 
models4 to 6 in Table 4). We consistently 
observed that a lower ADM was linked to a 
higher bank loan ratio, as stated by Ang et al. 
(2000), Ahn and Choi (2009), and Setiawan 
(2012).  
For the control variables, we find that the bigger 
and older firms show less agency conflict. The 
evidence in Table 3 and Table 4 suggests that 
creditors/banks will loosen their monitoring of 
company activities due to their consideration 
toward the monitoring that is conducted by other 
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banks, which in the end will result in a lack of 
monitoring of the company, which is reflected in 
its agency conflict. This study did not find 
evidence of the free-rider phenomenon among 
lending banks. Weak protection for creditors in 
developing countries, such as Indonesia, 
allegedly explains this condition. The banks 
continue to carry out their optimal supervision, 
despite other banks already monitoring the 
company. 
3.3.  The Effect of Institutional Ownership on 
Agency Conflicts at Different Bank 
Monitoring Levels 
a.  Total Institutional Ownership 
In the previous section, we discussed the 
results of the regression on the individual impact 
of the main variables (INST) on AUR and 
ADM. In this section, we examine these impacts 
while considering different proxies of bank 
monitoring. In other word, we question whether 
the effect of INST will vary at high or low 
numbers of banks (dNUM) and at high or low 
bank loan ratios (dLOANRATIO).  
Table 5 reports the regression results to test 
the impacts of total institutional ownership at 
different bank numbers and debt ratio levels. 
Agency conflict measured byAUR reveals the 
interaction variables of INST*dNUM and 
INST*dLOANRATIO have significant 
negative coefficients. These indicate a 
weakening positive influence of the total 
institutional ownership variable on AUR at 
higher bank numbers and bank debt ratios. 
Hence, the effect of INST becomes less positive 
when there are high numbers of banks that 
monitor a firm. But when the agency conflict is 
measured with the ADM ratio, two interaction 
variables show insignificant coefficients. We 
proceed to distinguish the type of institutional 
ownership in the following section.  




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INST -0.469***   -0.442***   
 (0.119)   (0.119)   
GOV  0.0294   -0.0141  
  (0.154)   (0.155)  
PRIV   -0.336***   -0.303*** 
   (0.0997)   (0.100) 
NUM -0.116*** -0.105** -0.109***    
 (0.0413) (0.0415) (0.0413)    
LOANRATIO    -0.477*** -0.485*** -0.440*** 
    (0.156) (0.158) (0.157) 
SIZE -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.133*** -0.156*** -0.151*** -0.162*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0157) (0.0161) (0.0160) 
AGE -0.110** -0.109** -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0442) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0439) 
CONSTANT 0.158 -0.160 0.155 0.532* 0.200 0.490 
 (0.315) (0.308) (0.319) (0.306) (0.297) (0.309) 
       
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: : *, **, *** represents a significance level of10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. ADM, num, size and age are natural 
logarithms, while INST, GOV, PRIV and loan ratio are in decimals. Higher ADM indicates higher agency conflicts. 
Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Total institutional ownership effect at different levels of bank monitoring 
VARIABLE 
AUR ADM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INST 0.472*** 0.875*** 0.472*** 0.657*** -0.476*** -0.515*** -0.480*** -0.665*** 
 (0.105) (0.158) (0.105) (0.150) (0.118) (0.180) (0.118) (0.170) 
dNUM 0.0880* 0.571***   0.0115 -0.0356   
 (0.0497) (0.151)   (0.0540) (0.171)   
INST*dNUM  -0.709***    0.0683   
  (0.208)    (0.235)   
dLOANRATIO   0.0216 0.263*   -0.148*** -0.388** 
   (0.0452) (0.146)   (0.0489) (0.166) 
INST*dLOANRATIO    -0.357*    0.352 
    (0.206)    (0.232) 
SIZE -0.0312** -0.0347** -0.0212 -0.0221 -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
AGE 0.300*** 0.297*** 0.301*** 0.301*** -0.111** -0.110** -0.126*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0380) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0436) (0.0436) (0.0437) (0.0437) 
CONSTANT -1.673*** -1.872*** -1.770*** -1.868*** 0.453 0.472 0.552* 0.650** 
 (0.284) (0.289) (0.281) (0.286) (0.306) (0.313) (0.302) (0.308) 
         
Observations 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 
Number of firm 304 304 304 304 285 285 285 285 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Joint effect  0.166  0.300**  -0.4467***  -0.313* 
Prob>chi2  0.2292  0.0379  0.0039  0.0515 
Notes:  dNUM equals to 1 for firms with higher-than-median bank numbers and 0 otherwise. dLOANRATIO has the value of 
1 if the number of banks is higher than its median number and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** represents significance level 
of10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. AUR, ADM, size and age are natural logarithms, dnum and dLOANRATIO are 
dummies, while INST is in decimals. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 6. Government ownership effect at different levels of bank monitoring 
VARIABLE 
AUR ADM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GOV 0.351** 0.0540 0.366** 0.349** 0.0478 0.556* -0.0144 -0.0435 
 (0.148) (0.300) (0.150) (0.165) (0.154) (0.299) (0.155) (0.172) 
Dnum 0.0892* 0.0782   0.0123 0.0354   
 (0.0500) (0.0509)   (0.0543) (0.0555)   
GOV*dNUM  0.386    -0.679**   
  (0.339)    (0.343)   
dLOANRATIO   0.0383 0.0359   -0.146*** -0.150*** 
   (0.0459) (0.0468)   (0.0497) (0.0510) 
GOV*dLOANRATIO    0.0876    0.137 
    (0.347)    (0.348) 
SIZE -0.0431*** -0.0430*** -0.0333** -0.0334** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
AGE 0.283*** 0.279*** 0.285*** 0.284*** -0.109** -0.100** -0.122*** -0.123*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0387) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0441) (0.0443) (0.0442) (0.0442) 
CONSTANT -1.229*** -1.216*** -1.332*** -1.329*** 0.103 0.0801 0.182 0.190 
 (0.275) (0.275) (0.271) (0.271) (0.297) (0.296) (0.292) (0.292) 
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Observations 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 
Number of firm 304 304 304 304 285 285 285 285 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Joint effect  0.440***  0.4366  -0.123  0.0935 
Prob>chi2  0.0086  0.1659  0.4859  0.7661 
Notes:  Dnumequals 1 for firms with higher-than-median bank numbers and 0 otherwise. dLOANRATIO has a value of 1 if 
the number of banks is higher than its median number and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. AUR, ADM, size and age are natural logarithms; dNUM and dLOANRATIO are dummies, 
while GOV is in decimals. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Private institutional ownership effect at different levels of bank monitoring 
VARIABLE 
AUR ADM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRIV 0.222** 0.705*** 0.220** 0.248** -0.353*** -0.576*** -0.331*** -0.360*** 
 (0.0907) (0.144) (0.0912) (0.118) (0.0992) (0.159) (0.0992) (0.128) 
dNUM 0.0881* 0.590***   0.0118 -0.216   
 (0.0500) (0.127)   (0.0541) (0.138)   
PRIV*dNUM  -0.769***    0.348*   
  (0.178)    (0.194)   
dLOANRATIO   0.0129 0.0541   -0.132*** -0.175 
   (0.0456) (0.119)   (0.0492) (0.129) 
PRIV* 
dLOANRATIO 
   -0.0644    0.0667  
(0.187) (0.173) 
SIZE -0.0289* -0.0344** -0.0190 -0.0189 -0.164*** -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
AGE 0.303*** 0.289*** 0.303*** 0.303*** -0.122*** -0.114*** -0.134*** -0.135*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0438) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0439) 
CONSTANT -1.521*** -1.728*** -1.612*** -1.626*** 0.441 0.533* 0.504* 0.517* 
 (0.287) (0.290) (0.284) (0.286) (0.309) (0.313) (0.304) (0.306) 
         
Observations 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,489 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 
Number of firm 304 304 304 304 285 285 285 285 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Joint effect  -0.064  0.1836  -0.228*  -0.2933** 
Prob>chi2  0.5706  0.1716  0.0604  0.0441 
Notes: dNUM equals 1 for firms with higher-than-median bank numbers and 0 otherwise. dLOANRATIO has a value of 1 if 
the number of banks is higher than its median number and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. AUR, ADM, size and age are natural logarithms, dnum and dloan ratio are dummies, while 
GOV is in decimals. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
b.  Government Institutional Ownership 
Table 6 shows the influence of government 
institutional ownership on agency conflict at 
different bank supervision levels. The test result 
displays that there was no significant interaction 
variable. Change only occurred in the govern-
ment institutional ownership variable, which 
went from a significant positive influence on 
AUR to insignificant at high bank number 
levels. 
The use of the ADM ratio is as an agency 
conflict proxy at different levels of bank 
monitoring. The test result showed only the 
GOV*dNUM interaction variable had signi-
ficant coefficient, indicating that higher 
government ownership will increase the ADM 
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ratio, but at a high bank number level this 
influence will be weakened.  
c.  Private Institutional Ownership  
Table 7 exhibits the differences in the impact 
of private institutional ownership on agency 
conflict at different bank monitoring levels. The 
results, particularly in model 2, showed the 
PRIV*dNUM interaction variable had a 
significant negative coefficient. The interpre-
tation is the positive impact of private 
institutional ownership on AUR tends to weaken 
at a higher bank number level, but is not 
significant at the higher bank loan ratio level 
(model 4).  
In models4 to 6, we found that 
PRIV*dNUM had significant coefficients on 
ADM, indicating that private institutional 
ownership can effectively limit the sales, general 
and administrative (ADM) expenses but it 
weakens at a higher number of banks.  
Overall, these results suggest that the 
influence of institutional ownership on agency 
conflict varies with different levels of bank 
monitoring, supporting our arguments above. 
The incentive of shareholders to monitor the 
firm apparently weakens as they consider that 
there are other parties (i.e. banks) that also keep 
an eye on firms, particularly related to their use 
of assets and other expenses. Institutional 
investors tend to loosen their monitoring when 
firms are at high bank monitoring levels, 
implying free-riding problems. 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS  
1 Conclusion 
Using data from non-financial firms listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange, this study analyzes 
the effect of institutional ownership and bank 
monitoring on agency conflicts. Total institu-
tional ownership, government ownership, and 
private ownership mitigate agency conflicts 
measured by the AUR ratio, showing that firms 
with higher institutional ownership have a better 
AUR ratio. Institutional shareholders use their 
privilege to be able to supervise the firms better 
(Shleifer &Vishny, 1986; Demsetz, 1983in 
Agrawal &Mandelker, 1990; Bathala et al., 
1994; Ang et al., 2000; Gillan& Starks, 2000; 
Noe, 2002; Delis et al, 2017).  
With regard to the ADM ratio, government 
ownership does not have a significant influence. 
One of the possible explanations for this is the 
government lacks the skills to monitor firms, 
compared to private institutions (Shleifer 
&Vishny, 1994 in La Porta, 1999; Qi et al., 
2000). Singh and Davidson (2003) argued that 
the ADM ratio tends to be invisible when 
compared to sales-related cash flow (AUR) so 
investors pay less concern to it.  
The number of bank lenders has a negative 
influence on agency conflict, measured by the 
AUR and ADM ratios. Firms borrowing from 
more banks have higher AUR and lower ADM, 
showing less agency conflict. No free-rider 
phenomenon in bank influence is found in this 
study. Note that the investor protection in 
developing countries tends to be weak, so that 
the bank lenders still have incentives to exercise 
supervision despite the other bank lenders (Yu et 
al., 2012). 
Meanwhile, the bank loan ratio is found to 
affect the agency conflict proxied with the ADM 
ratio, and is significantly negative. There is an 
increase in the banks’ incentive to supervise the 
firms with high bank debt ratios, as argued by 
Ang et al. (2000), Khalil and Parigi (1998) in 
Dass and Massa (2011), Ahn and Choi (2009), 
and Fok et al. (2004). The presence of the free-
rider problem is indicated by the weakening 
influence of institution ownership at high bank 
monitoring levels(bank number and bank debt 
ratio). The shareholders consider the monitoring 
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by the banks is sufficient so they relax their 
supervision.  
2. Limitations and Suggestions 
The institutional ownerships in this study are 
only measured by direct ownership, based on the 
available company reports. Further research may 
consider indirect ownership’s measurement or 
the ultimate owner to reflect the firms’ owner-
ship better. The type of institutional ownership 
might be divided into more groups to assess the 
research results and their persistence. In 
addition, the proxy of the agency conflict in this 
research was limited to accounting items. The 
use of market-related measurements, such as 
Tobins’ Q, is strongly suggested for any future 
studies. 
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